In recent years some scholars have been complaining about the effective impoverishment in the study of consciousness when only a reductionist and materialist approach is taken into account . It is surely a matter of contention among researchers whether and how much can be learnt about consciousness when some religious and philosophical traditions are more involved in this study, and whether science will be able to listen to those voices coming from outsiders.
Let us just pretend, as in a thought experiment, that some kind of insight could be gained on the problem of consciousness, if elements of the Christian theological tradition are integrated into a general view. Such a view may perhaps make sense of some of the acknowledged limits in the present scientific state of the study, on condition that it goes beyond a sheer rhetorical level; i.e. that such a contribution can provide real knowledge.
If the experiment is to be pursued, it is useful to ask which kind of knowledge may be provided, and which areas of consciousness studies will be illuminated from this perspective. Proceeding by exclusion, it seems that the theological-anthropological endeavor will be of no help in trying to solve the “hard problem”; indeed it will be out of touch with the neurological study of consciousness, or with any attempt to find “neural correlates” to it. Trying to imagine what kind of contribution theology may deliver, the most recurrent answer is one which has to do with the subjective experience of consciousness, even if validated by a strong tradition which offers an appearance of “objectivity” or at least renders it a little more normative and sustained by some kind of consensus. This approach implies not only the so called “religious consciousness”, which represents a particular case, but “consciousness” in general, affecting the different dimensions of human subjective experience.
Putting things in a different way, Nagel’s famous question can be adapted to our case: “What is it like to be conscious from a Christian point of view?” Or again: “Does the Christian faith change one’s perception of consciousness?” The questions have a specific value when the many different views of consciousness are adverted in several scientific and philosophical tendencies, and, as a result, an unavoidable pluralism seems to rule the present situation of the field. The recently published book of Susan Blackmore, Conversations on Consciousness, is a very good testimony to the perceived state of affairs. Indeed, it is difficult to find two scholars who coincide in their representation of that phenomenon, or perhaps epiphenomenon, except for very close collaborators. The general impression is that, at most, this pluralism of positions may be ordered or mapped into some kind of table with two axes, trying to give a reasonable account of the differences. Among these attempts, the one designed by F. Varela is well known, followed by the versions by Whitehead and Blackmore . But, at the moment, as far as I know, we cannot resort to any kind of broadly accepted “unified theory”, able to explain a substantial part of that experience.
What about the minimum consensus that can be gathered by looking at the different opinions? I accept that some minimal agreement can be found among the scholars devoted to such research. Just to mention one, it seems that, at present, a broad consensus deems any kind of dualist representation of the relationship between mind and brain unbearable. Certainly, the vast majority of authors share a broad faith in the advancement of our knowledge, which should ensure a better understanding of the deep integration between neurological system and subjective experience. Such a consensus excludes from the scientific realm any attempt to give a dualistic account, or to claim any transcendence beyond the material limits of the human being.
To make sense of this outcome from a Christian point of view, a contended question presents itself as to how far the Christian understanding of the human being is dualistic, and, furthermore, whether a model of “emergence” could be more appropriate to describe the traditional reality of the ‘soul’ , “after cognitive science” . As already stated, some scholars are complaining seriously about the insufficient research concerning the subjective dimension of the conscious experience, and claim the need to overcome “the taboo of subjectivity”, imposed by the materialistic agenda of many scientists; therefore, one possible conclusion is that religious traditions may offer a good place to start in order to obtain a larger picture of such an experience.
Surely I am not breaking a taboo when trying to integrate some religious perceptions into the scholarly research of consciousness. Indeed, a good deal of work is taking place in this direction: studies on meditation, contemplation and, especially Buddhist and Hinduist traditions have been the object of serious research . Let me spend a couple of words on this subject. In my view, the interest in that field is not necessarily related to a religious concern or the attempt to grasp the specific religious sense of the subjective experience. Very often the study on meditation is driven by other interests; just to quote some of them: the possibility to gain access to altered states of mind that can offer a better understanding of consciousness as a “variable”; the plausible strategy to empty the mind of any content in order to observe some kind of “essential or pure conscious state”; the ability that such methods can provide for training skilled observers in an intersubjective play of consciousness; and even the interest to implement, through meditation, its deflationary understanding .
The problem is the lack of a more committed research in what can be called the “study of religious consciousness”, which certainly does not exist in abstract or general terms, but is ever linked to a concrete tradition and intentionally related to broadly shared representations. Of course, we include here an increasing amount of literature on the topic of so called “cognitive science of religion”. However, the real relationship between religious experience and conscious experience is still to be explored more in depth and with better tools, including the testimony of these traditions.

1. Where to start?
If the project is to be pursued beyond the rhetorical level, and some bridge is to be built from the theological bank to the shore of a more objective knowledge, one obvious author to start with is William James and his attempt to display a scientific psychology of religious experience. I am convinced that at least a couple of suggestions from James are still of great value for the task in hand: first, the recovery of the pragmatic method as the best way to make sense of such an experience; and second, the exploration of the world of consciousness as a reality which offers a different view and understanding of the world. The same point may be formulated differently, and more congenially to the pragmatic way of thinking: what difference does it make if we take consciousness seriously? What changes when such an experience is religiously informed?
Putting the problem in pragmatic terms helps to avoid some shortcomings of a more ideological stance, and helps to escape a too precipitate scientific closure of the subject. Even in its minimalist version, the pragmatic account ensures at least a possibility of gaining some access to the religious conscious experience and its ability to influence real life and relationships, even if it can generate the illusion of a ‘black box’.
In my opinion, such an approach should be considered of some importance to any integrated presentation of consciousness. It is a merit of Blackmore’s book (cited above) to raise the practical questions and the consequences which derive from the conceptions of consciousness that are traded in the academia and divulged through several channels, including popular media. Many of the scholars interviewed were asked about the personal consequences that the study of consciousness has had in their lives, and the answers were quite varied: for some the real repercussion has been minimal, for others it was changing their way of understanding and to relating to the world. A case in point was the question of free will, which is very much affected by the way we understand our mind, even if I could not manage to establish any kind of reasonable pattern between variables (e.g. more or less deflationary strategies and more or less free will). The question should be translated to the broader field of the social and cultural consequences of some views of the human mind, which seem to become standard in many academic contexts, but few people are willing to take the risk to ascertain what could happen if these views were to become the broadly accepted understanding of the nature and destiny of human beings.
The problem of attending to the consequences of a one’s own theory may seem out of reach for a scientific enterprise, but is not negligible from a philosophical point of view, if we want to avoid the pitfalls of an irresponsible use of science. It seems that the ethical dimension of science, or its practical effects, re-enter necessarily into the development of a responsible research; otherwise some undesirable outcomes could again bring scientific thought under fire and renew the difficult questions on the limitations of science.
If the pragmatic method can open some doors, it can at the same time and by the same token close others; and indeed nothing warrants that the religious-Christian experience will be more appropriate in order to cope with some problems at many levels of individual and social life. Indeed, some scholars are suggesting that a deflationary understanding of consciousness could spare more pain and distress than the traditional substantive insight: diminishing our pretense to constitute a substantial personal identity could provide some advantages and deflate our will to prevail, with all the troubles unleashed by it, and with all the anguish associated with it.
It seems worthwhile to test both approaches, or at least not to exclude in principle either of them, in the expectation that time will select the better suited one and give an answer to the question about the appraisal of mind, identity and free will, which fares better in the advanced societies and is more suited to the environmental conditions in which we live.
An alternative approach, in line with a pragmatic-empirical method, is offered by Max Velmans, as he recalls the convenience of taking into account the experiences of those who have helped to improve our consciousness and have benefitted the human race, in a kind of “separation of theories from their effects”.
At this point, and in those circumstances, a Christian view of subjectivity can be seen more as an exercise on “betting”; an up-to-date Pascalian wager, that favors a way of understanding consciousness which can bring more benefits than other views in line with the materialist standard.
The second suggested starting point calls for a serious consideration of consciousness as a reality not homogeneous or assimilable to the objective world of things, and whose presence changes our perspective on the entire reality. Following the enunciated pragmatic principle, the idea is that our entire view of the world changes when consciousness is taken seriously into account as a very special experience. What changes? The intellectual experiment of the zombies, so frequently alleged by Chalmers and others, in our case can acquire a different meaning. If it is admitted that consciousness is something significant, not a sheer epiphenomenon, and that it contributes to giving a new dimension to reality and personal life, a very different knowledge of person and one’s place in the world is gained. In a very synthetic approach, implying that reality is not exhausted by the objective dimension, and that there is a world “number three” or “number four” not consisting only by “mental states”, but driven by a rich and irreducible human experience laying claim to a proper status, expression, and place. It means reckoning with a high level of freedom and contingence, of responsibility and guilt, of hope and despair, of creativity and sense of submission; in short, a world less mechanical and predictable, where a different realm arises, presided over by a distinct logic. In the words of D. Chalmers, “consciousness is … a fundamental feature of the world, as irreducible as space and time” , it means, a deep property of reality, a kind of “transcendental” in Kantian terms. And the opinion of Varela is that “being human is being alive; it is knowing profoundly that those around me are conscious” ; for him too, consciousness is a condition of possibility for our way of remaining in the world and of establishing relationships with others: it is a given reality, presupposed in any interaction, as “rules” governing the play. And, just to add another example, Max Velmans describes the fundamental character of consciousness, even if evolved with mater, as more closely linked to the realm of information .
Does such a perception derive from a kind of incommensurability principle? Not necessarily; perhaps it would be more adequate to speak of a “complementarity” principle. If such a realm is acknowledged, a special kind of theory is required to deal with it and a, legitimate approach is made possible by disciplines more akin to such a domain – not only phenomenology.

2. Nearing a Christian model of consciousness
Now it is time to try to describe what is specific to the Christian theological understanding of consciousness, its difference from other models, and to place it inside the available maps, if only we manage to find a particular space in this pluralism. My attempt at describing these traits will take into account their complexity and show their relationship with some of the best known theories available in the disciplinary domain of consciousness studies.
1. First of all, Christian anthropology assumes quite a substantial view on consciousness, far from the more deflative versions “a la Dennett”. Assuming such a view, a more consistent perception of the personal identity is intended, or rather an “enduring self”. However, things are not so simple even at this elementary level. Certainly, there are several questions in the theological tradition that subvert a too peaceful description. An important point is that Christian anthropology conceives personal identity in a dependent or derivative way, in contrast with modern Enlightenment anthropology, that stresses the self-constitution of personal identity, founded in one’s own consciousness (Descartes and Kant being central examples). The principle of identity is in any way based on an experience of alterity and dialogue, first with God, who calls to life and awakens our conscious being, and then with other persons, who, from an ontogenetic and a practical point of view, interact with one’s own mind in order to give rise to the sense of identity, as a strong current of psychology and philosophy has stressed in recent decades. This view deflates, in some way, a concept of consciousness too solid and reified, and allows for a more open and ethical understanding of human reality, bridging subjective experience with alterity, first person to second person approaches .
2. A contended question is in what way the cognitive idea of consciousness is to be related or even identified with the Christian topic of the “soul”. Some studies had been published in recent years and there is a lack of consensus and a search for better solutions, as, for example, those available from the platonic and Aristotelian tradition . The problem is that these views had been fashioned into a pre-scientific conception, and built into the available axiomatic. There are many who proclaim the need to adapt Christian anthropological ideas to the new scientific frame, as has happened with cosmology; but it is not easy to find a common ground. Consequently, the question about monism and dualism needs a revision as well. Even from a biblical point of view some authors resist the dualistic standard, which distinguishes two kinds of realities: soul and body. Emergence seems to be a good solution, even though not everyone is happy with such a proposal . Surely, a distinction is to be made between epistemological dualism (which, as already shown, refers to the need to distinguish between the objective and subjective realms, in order to stress the strong presence and influence of consciousness), psychological dualism (claiming the contrast between conscious and unconscious states) and ontological dualism, which should be defined in order to clarify the range of difference an entity would be acknowledged to possess in the subjective realm, thus maintaining its distinctness or special account of things. As some critics have shown, it is far from solved: any attempt to give some entity to consciousness yields an unavoidable dualistic consequence, especially when the irreducibility of consciousness is defended. In any case, the greater question of dualism and monism is one that involves much more than just the problem of representing subjectivity or soul; it has to do with the aforementioned question of alterity, and, on the other hand, the need to keep a dual code for every communication and for the working of every system, even the personal one (N. Luhmann). After all, being a metaphysical question, I am not sure that mere scientific development will solve the big question on the possibility of reducing dualism to a monistic stance.
3. An adjoining question is: How exclusively human is the experience of consciousness? The point is that Christian anthropology has stressed human uniqueness, and has derived some important consequences in order to understand its identity and special relationship between humans and with God. It is already assumed that morality seems to be a solely human predicament. At least, from a Christian point of view, we cannot be sure about how much “panpsyquism” is to be admitted. As long as we ignore the particular forms of animal consciousness, the conviction is that there is a substantial difference between human and non-human consciousness, and that the first form implies a sort of “excellence” or “privilege” compared with other possible forms, due to its complexity, and because it allows for a richer form of communication or interaction with oneself and with other people; it allows for a high level of reflexivity which is indispensable for any real experience of freedom and moral decision .
4. One consequence strongly linked to a more substantive view of consciousness in the Christian tradition is the conviction of the “immortality of the soul”. It can be read as a consequence of a strong substantial view of personal identity linked to the idea of soul and a deeply dualistic insight of the relationship between “brain and mind”, where the second can even subsist in an autonomous way. Let us make some notes in the margin. First, the theological discussion has, for many years, felt uneasy with the traditional version of immortality, especially with the strong dualism that is involved, and it points to new versions where such a division or distinction can be overcome . As a result, the eschatological panorama, previously clear, has become fuzzier, especially as it tries to represent the forms of life after death. Immortality continues to be an assumption and a consequence of the Christian doctrine about the nature of humans and about a more substantial consciousness, but, at the same time, it is impossible to engage in further descriptions, or to try and give more substance to this conviction. My impression is that consciousness escapes any attempt to objectivise it, even when attempting to give an account of its immortality. Like consciousness, immortality is a mysterious and unassailable concept, traditionally perceived in a precarious way, and strongly connected to some sorts of introspection, and perhaps to its paroxysm and pathologies. However, in the Christian code, consciousness comes hand in hand with the awareness of being immortal, and of a destiny subject to great risk.
5.  The Christian understanding of consciousness can only partly assume the model of a “central workspace”, and undermines every assumption of “being in control” or “in charge”, as if that faculty could allow for a complete organization of all mental conscious domains. In a further move to deflate consciousness, Christian anthropology, since the beginning, has assumed an embodied vision of it, which implies, among other consequences, a statute of limitation, a consubstantial weakness and some degree of “loss of control”, which affects the extent and real effect of freedom. Some authors have represented the conscious mind as a kind of “battlefield”, where a constant contention goes on between different tendencies, and where sometimes the overwhelming power of other forces trying to prevail among more conscious and ordered thought is experienced. The tradition of the Apostle Paul, and to a greater extent, the writings of St. Augustine, give a strong witness about such a tension, which traditionally is expressed under the name of “concupiscence”. The medieval theological tradition has kept the same focus, and has warned about a deep disorder presiding in the human ability to govern all aspects of one’s life from a conscious level. Rather, it has been modern anthropology which has sought to instigate an image of the conscious human being in full control of one’s personal reality and able to overcome the traditionally felt limits. The Christian view insists on the illusionary character of such a pretension and calls for the need for redemption. In contrast with other opinions, such a perception does not yield a “sense of peace”, but is felt as a source of troubles . In this “field”  becoming conscious happens only after a certain process of “awakening”, or rather, a kind of “calling” through instruction, and points to a more humble sense of the frail human reality and impotence, asking for redemption. Within the limits of Christian jargon, being conscious means, more than anything else, being aware of one’s own sinfulness, feeling deeply dissociated from ourselves because of the ancient guilt we call “original sin”, and consequently, being dissociated from a more direct relationship with God: consciousness means this awareness of not being what we should be, as we live with this fracture. Still more: consciousness is ever a sort of limited state so long we are not fully tuned in with God.
6. The last central point in the Christian appraisal of consciousness is its ability to transcend and to offer a point of contact for a true religious experience. In a negative account: an unconscious mind – a zombie – would be incapable of any sort of religious experience, even if, carrying on that mental experiment, it could behave as though praying or attending a religious service. In the Christian picture, being conscious is a condition or requirement of true religious experience . In some sense, we can assert that consciousness is a condition enabling religious experience, or transcendence. It has often been said that consciousness already represents a first form of transcendence, and therefore, it is not strange that some kind of parallelism, convergence, or continuity can be perceived between one experience and the other. And conversely it can be said, as the writings of St. Augustine testify, among others, true religious experience brings to a greater awareness of one’s own consciousness and place in the world, even when such an experience is sometimes lived as revelatory and at other times as tragic . It is not surprising that very similar obstacles are found when attempting to translate first person accounts of consciousness, on the one hand, and of religious experience, on the other. In either case, the perception of consciousness as locus of transcendence admits different figures and forms, not reduced to the mystic format of emptiness, but it often appears more akin to the experience of strong feelings and emotions. However, it is a field that needs further exploration, if one desires to go beyond too simplistic accounts, or too much mediated through religious forms of only one kind.

3. Some open ends
After what has been said is not easy to place the Christian account of consciousness into one of the available tables of axis. Some attempt is made in the following figures. Certainly, even if it is felt as a substantial reality, it suffers from two kinds of deflationary pressures: one from its intersubjective dependence, and the other from a sense of frailty and guilt. Even if there is a clear inclination towards free will, it is impossible to silence those who limit its real reach – especially in the Lutheran tradition. It clearly defends a sense of immortality, but is perceived in an unquiet and uncertain way. It is quite often lived as a dramatic experience, together with faith, as Kierkegaard recalls, and as a factor of crisis and self-displacement, as has been observed in the experiences of conversion, where a kind of new awareness arises over the old one. Christian consciousness empowers, bringing a sense of self-transcendence and deep knowledge, but at the same time, deflates, as it generates a sense of guilt and dependency. This paradoxical state surely reproduces dynamics characteristic of consciousness in general, due to its essential reflexivity.
As a general statement, it is better to acknowledge a deep difference between the Christian understanding of consciousness and the modern one, which perhaps is more subject to criticism from the new, scientifically informed view. The modern image of consciousness has inflated it in a disproportionate way, giving way to the “philosophy of conscience” and to the apotheosis of modern empowerment of self and mind. The nineteenth century critical philosophies have called strongly to a greater roll of consciousness as a way to overcome alienation and to gain every measure of emancipation: social (Marx), psychological (Freud) or anthropologic-vitalist (Nietzsche). Being conscious was the key to every project opening the path to a new human and social condition, to several therapeutic approaches, and to a sense of enlightenment or of gaining a deeper insight into reality and personal experience. Certainly the roots of such an inflationary tendency can be traced back in the Christian thought, but only within limits. Indeed, Christian perception of the conscious dimension has ever tried to account for other dimensions of life and human experience, which, despite moving on a different level, nevertheless, play a strong role in human life and behavior. The limits of consciousness or its deflation– in the Christian tradition – also come from its status of dependency, arising as a result of an external call, and works, at least in the proper way, just as it keeps an intersubjective or external reference. Consciousness is, in general Christian terms, a gain, not just an epiphenomenon, but an experience making a different world possible, or enabling people to play a different game, beyond the evolutionary one of fitting in and succeeding. In any case, the advantage is perceived as dramatic too, as long as it favors – among other things – an awareness of one’s own guilt and personal drama. Nevertheless, at the same time, it provides a way of living in a different dimension our biological and unconscious constraints, like the need for mating and collaboration (which, in conscious language becomes ‘love’ and ‘friendship’).
Therefore, the place of the Christian understanding of consciousness should be found at some point between the maximalism of the philosophy of conscience, or of the modern priority of the subject (“the anthropological turn”) and the minimalist view of the reductivist or physicalist party, reducing it to a sheer epiphenomenon we could even do without. 

  
Varela schema of theories of cons. Whitehead schema

I am not sure about the possibility of developing a sort of “meta-theory” able to place the Christian account beneath and among others, especially because it seems that the access so proposed is more narrative than theoretical, and deals just with testimonies of witnesses. These accounts had been acknowledged throughout the centuries because of their ability to tell and render explicit experiences shared by most believers. In the end, a sense of concurrence among diverse representations of consciousness is unavoidable, and, from such a viewpoint, a pragmatic method is called for to discern which ‘narrative’ can render a better account, or show a more appropriate understanding in dealing with the present anthropological challenges.
On the other hand, it is indisputable that Christian anthropology learns from the development of cognitive sciences and from the many proposals or accounts of consciousness available . The conversation with several authors and theories has helped to extend the present report.
Perhaps the Christian knowledge, developed by a long tradition, can contribute to clarify some aspects or dimensions of consciousness often neglected in a scientific and materialist approach. In this sense, a more hermeneutical method can complement the phenomenological one, which has been accepted in some circles of the cognitive study of consciousness. The hermeneutical approach takes into account the testimonies borne throughout the centuries and which had gained some degree of “authority”, because of their ability to describe broadly shared experiences . As long as certainty cannot been achieved in this field, neither by a scientific or by a phenomenological approach, it is better to look for some collaboration between different systems of knowledge able to provide a better insight into that central dimension of human life.